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Abstract 
Background: Psychological and social problems such as mental disorder, unemployment, 
substance misuse and crime are personally distressing and absorb huge proportions of 
Government effort. Addressing these is a multi-agency, multidisciplinary exercise, but there is 
evidence of a marked policy shift toward the provision of psychological therapies and 
interventions. 
Aim: To offer a distinctively psychological perspective on these key social and mental health 
problems.   
Method: Scholarly review of the relevant literature. 
Results: This paper presents a coherent model – the mediating psychological processes 
model – addressing the complex, interconnected, nature of these problems. The mediating 
psychological processes model suggests that disruption or dysfunction in psychological 
processes is a final common pathway in the development of mental disorder and social 
problems. The model proposes that biological, social and circumstantial factors lead to mental 
disorder, crime and other social problems through their conjoint effects in influencing or 
disrupting relevant psychological processes. 
Conclusions: The implications for policy, and implementation of policy, are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The human and economic costs 
About 450 million people worldwide suffer from a mental or behavioural disorder. 
Depression alone ranks as the third leading contributor to the global burden of diseases 
(World Health Organisation, 2003a). In the UK, mental health problems represent 
approximately 10% of total healthcare costs (Department of Health, 2005) and result in an 
estimated £23 billion of lost employment and productivity (Social Exclusion Unit, 2003). Three 
of the 10 leading risk factors for physical disease are psychological or behavioural (unsafe 
sex, tobacco use, alcohol use) and three others are closely related to psychological issues 
(obesity, high blood pressure and cholesterol) (World Health Organisation, 2003b). Drug 
misuse is estimated to cost the UK up to £18 billion a year in social and economic costs 
(Home Office, 2002). There were nearly 11 million crimes in England and Wales in 2005-
2006; costing an estimated £60 billion a year (Home Office, 2000). 
Clearly these issues overlap, and not only because some crimes are drug related and 
some offenders have mental health problems. A fundamental theoretical, as well as practical, 
challenge is to account for this interconnectedness. 
 
A psychological model 
In 1977 George Engel published his ‘biopsychosocial model’ of mental illness. His 
aim was to challenge biomedical paradigms of understanding human distress, and to offer a 
framework that would allow psychological and social factors to play a more appropriate role in 
understanding and caring for people in personal crisis. Engel commented that: “the dominant 
model of disease today is biomedical, and it leaves no room within its framework for the 
social, psychological and behavioural dimensions of illness” (Engel, 1977; p130). In contrast, 
Engel’s biopsychosocial model suggests that mental disorder and other medical conditions 
emerge as products of a whole human system which has physical, biological, elements, but 
also psychosocial systems including personal, dyadic, familial, community and societal 
elements 
The biopsychosocial model was widely and enthusiastically adopted by psychiatry (or 
at least English psychiatry) (Falloon & Fadden, 1993), but opposition from some mainstream 
psychiatrists has led to social and psychological factors often relegated to become mere 
moderators of the direct causal role of biological processes (Guze, 1989). Similar models 
have promoted sociological, ecological and psychological approaches (e.g. House, 2002), but 
are typically imprecise in the causal relationship between the bio- psycho- and social 
elements. 
The mediating psychological processes model (Kinderman, 2005), in contrast, 
suggests that disruption or dysfunction in psychological processes is a final common pathway 
in the development of mental disorder. Psychological approaches have always separated 
events from the interpretation of events. The mediating psychological processes model 
addresses this issue by separating circumstantial factors from the psychological processes 
that interpret, buffer, and control responses to those events. These processes include, but are 
not limited to, cognitive processes. The model proposes that biological and social factors, 
together with a person’s individual experiences, lead to mental disorder through their conjoint 
effects on those psychological processes. 
 
 
 
In this model, physical, biological, factors are clearly recognised as of causal 
importance in mental disorder – and in other social issues – but achieve their effects through 
their effects on the mediating (and not merely moderating) psychological processes. For 
example, dopaminergic factors believed to be significant in schizophrenia are acknowledged 
(as are the genetic aspects of these factors) but are seen to have their effects on individuals 
through their impact on perceptual and cognitive systems (Bentall, 2003). Similarly, 
serotonergic processes associated with depression are seen to be associated with mental 
disorder because of their effects on psychological processes associated with self-esteem, 
beliefs in self-efficacy, motivation and expectations of reward. 
The same principles apply to social and circumstantial factors. Living in conditions of 
social deprivation and poverty can indeed lead to problems such as depression – but through 
the effects on psychological processes related to the disillusionment, hopelessness, and 
learned helplessness which constitute a realization that one’s actions have no effect or 
purpose (Evans, Saltzman & Cooperman, 2001). Being abused or traumatized obviously 
leads to problems, but this association is, again, mediated by the disruption or malformation 
of psychological processes - the ways in which the children (and later the adults) appraise 
themselves, the people in their lives, and the ways in which relationships and social 
intercourse should be governed (Young, 1999). 
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year in social and economic costs (Home Offi ce, 2002). There were nearly 11 million crimes in 
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offenders have mental health problems. A fundamental theoretical, as well as practical, challenge 
is to account for this interconnectedness.
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In 1977, George Engel published his ‘biopsychosocial model’ of mental illness. His aim was to 
challenge biomedical paradigms of understanding human distress, and to offer a framework that 
would allow psychological and social factors to play a more appropriate role in understanding 
and caring for people in personal crisis. Engel commented that: ‘The dominant model of disease 
today is biomedical, and it leaves no room within its framework for the social, psychological and 
behavioural dimensions of illness’ (1977, p. 130). In contrast, Engel’s biopsychosocial model sug-
gests that mental disorder and other medical conditions emerge as products of a whole human 
system which has physical, biological, elements, but also psychosocial systems including personal, 
dyadic, familial, community and societal elements.
The biopsychosocial model was widely and enthusiastically adopted by psychiatry (or at least 
English psychiatry) (Falloon & Fadden, 1993), but opposition from some mainstream psychiatrists 
has led to social and psychological factors often being relegated to become mere moderators of 
the direct causal role of biological processes (Guze, 1989). Similar models have promoted socio-
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in the causal relationship between the bio-, psycho- and social elements.
The mediating psychological processes model (Kinderman, 2005), in contrast, suggests that dis-
ruption or dysfunction in psychological processes is a fi nal common pathway in the development 
of mental disorder. Psychological approaches have always separated events from the interpretation 
of events. The mediating psychological processes model addresses this issue by separating circum-
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model proposes that biological and social factors, together with a person’s individual experiences, 
lead to mental disorder through their conjoint effects on those psychological processes.
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Process Black
The central claim of the mediating psychological processes model presented here – 
that such processes constitute a final common pathway for the emergence of mental disorder 
and related social problems – should be seen as evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. The 
five component elements; the experiences themselves – the distress (or ‘symptoms of mental 
illness’), the biological, social and circumstantial factors and psychological factors, are 
commonly referred to in psychological approaches (Read, Mosher & Bentall, 2004). And it is 
not unique for psychoanalysts and psychotherapists to argue that psychological processes 
are important (see, for example, Allen, Fonagy & Bateman, 2008). The mediating 
psychological processes model is different not because it incorporates new material, but in 
the hierarchical relationship it proposes between these factors. Traditional psychiatric or 
medical approaches to human behaviour and emotional distress places weight on biological, 
synaptic changes or processes (see Guze, 1989). Traditional social models of mental health 
and social problems certainly acknowledge the role of social causal factors, but differ from 
psychological models in the weight or role given to the personal, individual, cognitive, 
processes. Even the biopsychosocial model differs from the medicating psychological 
processes model in that, while the former implicitly gives equal weight to the three elements 
of its name, the latter treats psychological issues differently. The fact that those psychological 
processes are responsible for determining the human response to the causal factors means 
that these processes are given a more central role. By suggesting that disruption of 
psychological mechanisms is a final common pathway in the development of problems, this 
approach has significant, if subtle, implications for policy. 
 
Implications for mental health services 
The clinical implications of this model (Kinderman & Tai, 2006) are that formulations 
rather than diagnoses should predominate clinical planning, that these formulations should 
detail the hypothesised disruption to mediating psychological processes or mechanisms, that 
psychological therapies should receive higher priority, and that medical, social and even 
psychological interventions are most likely to be clinically effective if they are designed on the 
basis of their likely beneficial impact on underlying psychological mechanisms. Of course, this 
does not mean that only psychologists should develop such formulations, Indeed, Kinderman 
and Tai (2006) acknowledge that many mental health professions use such formulations, and 
argue that this should continue. Of course, social workers have traditionally had professional 
responsibility for many of the problems referred to here. It is unlikely (and probably 
undesirable) that an army of applied psychologists be recruited to take their place. But it does 
follow that the formulations or care plans drawn up by social workers and other social care 
providers should address the psychological processes – and not merely the social and 
environmental circumstances – contributing to the identified problems. 
This model implies that mental health services should be planned on the basis of 
need and functional outcome rather than diagnostic categories. Identification of common 
mediating psychological process, along with common antecedents and empirically 
demonstrable interventions for those psychological mechanisms may offer a common 
language for research and planning. In residential care, a concept of ‘hospital’ should be 
avoided. The focus of specialist teams should be based on underlying psychological 
principles. Services should fully embrace the recovery approach (Ralph & Corrigan, 2005) 
and should facilitate genuine service user involvement. Access should be improved to 
psychological therapies based on individual case formulations and recovery models, and 
nurses, occupational therapists and social workers should develop increasing competencies 
in psychosocial interventions. Psychologists should offer consultation and clinical leadership, 
while psychiatry should emphasise the application of medical expertise as it assists a 
multidisciplinary team in the understanding and treatment of mental disorder. 
The mediating psychological processes model may have implications for legal 
process too. In most jurisdictions, it is important to determine whether a person was unable, 
at the time of an offence, to understand what they were doing or if it was wrong. In the UK, 
this is judged on the basis of the presence of a ‘disease of the mind’ (Butler Committee, 
1975). In a psychological model, the question whether the person knows the difference 
between right or wrong is entirely sensible, but the material issue is not one of a ‘disease of 
the mind’, but whether the person’s ability to understand the difference between right and 
wrong was significantly perturbed by the sources of influence outlined above. The law has 
always required a very high threshold in this respect – people are presumed ‘to possess a 
sufficient degree of reason to be responsible’ for their actions (Butler Committee, 1975). From 
a psychological perspective, however, courts should consider issues of diminished 
responsibility by examining the extent to which the person’s normal psychological processes 
(relevant to the crime in question) were disrupted or disturbed. Was the person, at the 
material time, very significantly impaired in their ability to exercise normal, reasonable, 
judgement? 
 
Social problems 
The mediating psychological processes model of mental disorder is wholly applicable 
more widely to social problems such as crime, antisocial behaviour, social exclusion, drug 
use and the like. A transliteration of ‘mental disorder’ into ‘social problem’ seems perfectly 
reasonable if one accepts that mental disorder should no longer be regarded as similar to a 
disease process (Bentall, 2003). 
Although different commentators may disagree about how much variance in 
criminality or indeed other social problems can be laid at the feet of biological or physical 
factors (most would suggest much less than at the feet of social difficulties), it is entirely 
possible that these factors are non-trivial. In the mediating psychological processes model, 
this is addressed in the same manner as the biological contributors to mental disorder. If such 
biological factors do impact on crime and other social problems, the mediating psychological 
processes model suggests that they do so because of the ways in which they disrupt relevant 
psychological processes. 
                  The same general approach applies, as it did in the case of mental disorder, to 
social factors and life circumstances. There is no doubt that these two broad classes of 
causal agents are implicated in the development of social problems (e.g. Canter & Alison, 
2000; Cullen, 1984; Robinson, 2004). But clearly not everyone exposed to causal factors 
such as social deprivation goes on to offend, misuse drugs or otherwise experience social 
problems. The mediating psychological processes model suggests that these individual 
differences are explained by the differential ways in which these factors impact on the 
relevant mediating psychological processes. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that issues of disillusionment, lack of personal efficacy 
or sense of agency and the like are associated with social deprivation and abuse on the one 
hand and with both social issues such as crime, drug misuse and antisocial behaviour as well 
as depression and other mental disorders on the other. But this analysis does rather beg the 
question of what psychological mechanisms are actually associated with the kinds of social 
problems discussed here. This is not the place to outline these in detail, but it is fair to say 
that a considerable number of psychological issues – mainly ‘hard’ issues such as cognition, 
memory, attention, concentration IQ and problem-solving capacity – have been associated 
with key social challenges (McGuire, 2000). Social commentators and criminologists discuss 
issues such as social alienation or anomie, failures in parenting, difficulties in attachment and 
role models, discipline in the sense of the learning of the consequences for behaviour. Others 
comment on the possible problems some challenging young people appear to have in terms 
of deferment of gratification, problem-solving, social cognition and emotion-control. Above, in 
relation to mental health, the cognitive schemas governing relationships and social 
intercourse were seen as key mediating psychological mechanisms (Kinderman, 2005). This 
principle clearly extends wider – to the network of relationships collectively referred to as 
social capital (Baron, Field & Schuller, 2000). Indeed, it suggests how that social capital is 
constructed psychologically, and how, and how functioning communities may be developed. 
These ideas raise interesting questions of the nature or meaning of responsibility – 
even of ‘free will’. If our actions, even criminal actions, are the consequences of the 
psychological processes that are themselves affected by social adversity, to what extent can 
we be said to be responsible for our actions? Current psychological science cannot claim to 
have answers to all such questions, but it is worth noting two significant points. First, 
psychologists have long recognised that people distribute responsibility between salient 
causal influences when making causal attributions (Hewstone, 1989). Second, some 
jurisdictions (in particular the Netherlands) operate a ‘sliding scale’ of criminal responsibility, 
explicitly acknowledging the varying level of external influence on such behaviours (and, in 
this model, on psychological processes) (van der Leij, Jackson, Malsch & Nijboer, 2002). 
 
Multi-agency solutions to multi-factorial problems 
Many complex and difficult issues in mental health and social care are increasingly 
being addressed using multi-agency approaches. There are in the UK several major initiatives 
aimed at developing multidisciplinary approaches to mental health care (Department of 
Health, 2004). The Care Programme Approach (a multidisciplinary plan for mental health 
care) is paralleled by multi-agency services such as Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
Services, ‘BEST’ Behaviour and Educational Support Teams, and SureStart (a multi-agency 
attempt to address social exclusion and child developmental difficulties in socially deprived 
areas). Multi-agency approaches protecting the public from sexual predation and other 
serious crimes through ‘Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements’, bringing together 
health, prison, police, probation and social services personnel can also be seen. This is the 
common currency of the UK Government’s Social Exclusion Task Force, and similar 
approaches exist in most Western countries. 
The mediating psychological processes model is clearly consonant with this 
approach. It is axiomatic that a number of distal causes (from the social, biological and 
experiential constituencies) acieve their impact through their conjoint effects on a number of 
psychological processes. It makes sense therefore, to regard reasonable interventions or 
solutions as inviting a multi-agency response. The model does not, incidentally, imply that 
social factors are unimportant. Quite the reverse. It suggests that identifying and ameliorating 
social disadvantage is vital in addressing positive outcome. It may be possible, as an expert 
psychological therapist, positively to influence psychological mechanisms concerned with 
self-concept, interpersonal relationships and motivation. But any such interventions are likely 
to be much less effective than removing or addressing the social disadvantage at source. 
Again, this is an evolutionary rather than revolutionary perspective. This approach 
does not suggest that psychologists hold the keys to the kingdom. Of course, there exist 
professional psychologists – clinical psychologists, neuropsychologists, forensic, 
occupational, counselling, health and educational psychologists. These professionals attempt 
to develop and deliver psychological interventions addressed to the mediating psychological 
processes themselves. Given the central and mediating role offered to psychological 
processes in the model presented here, the role of psychological expertise could be 
substantial. Psychologists should assist in developing and ensuring the implementation of 
care plans that draw together identified needs of the service user (Kinderman & Tai, 2006). 
Psychologists should not be secondary to social policy, but should be imbedded in it. 
But the point of this model is that social and health initiatives achieve their effects 
(mirroring the causation of problems) through their positive impacts on the mediating 
psychological processes. This can inform planning regardless of the activity of professional 
psychologists. Parenting programmes may be welcome, but should be evaluated on the basis 
of their impact on the psychological mechanisms theoretically identified as legitimate targets – 
self-concept, attachment, an appreciation of sanctions for unacceptable behaviour, or models 
of social problem-solving. Psychosocial crime reduction programmes should be similarly 
targeted on the psychological issues (for example social problem-solving, impulse-control, 
etc) believed to mediate the route to criminality. If we wish to address, say, addiction (to 
nicotine, alcohol or any other substance), the model presented here would suggest that it is 
essential – whatever the mode of intervention – to ensure that any interventions target 
effectively those psychological mechanisms that maintain addictive behaviour. This clearly 
does not necessitate psychological therapy. Rather it means that social policies, health 
education campaigns and Government action such as taxation or legislation should be 
planned on the basis of their positive effects on psychological processes. A multiagency 
response is a logical extension of the mediating psychological processes model. 
 
Conclusions 
The mediating psychological processes model presented here offers a coherent 
conceptualization of the role of psychological mechanisms in the origin of both mental 
disorders and a range of social problems. The suggestion that disruption or dysfunction in 
psychological processes is a final common pathway in the development of such social 
problems can help to understand the causal roles played by biological, social and 
circumstantial factors, in that these elements lead to problems through their conjoint effects 
on mediating psychological processes or mechanisms. The implications for research, 
interventions, and policy could be considerable. The mediating psychological processes 
model of the development and maintenance of personal and social problems has the potential 
to facilitate the development of public policy on a wide range of issues. 
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